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The practice turn in social theory has renewed interest in conceptualising the temporal organisation 
of social life as a way of explaining contemporary patterns of living and consuming. As a result, the 
interest to develop analyses of time in both practice theories and practice theory-based empirical 
research is increasing. Practice theorists draw on theories of time and ideas about temporal rhythms 
to explain how practices are organised in everyday life. To date, they have studied how temporal 
experiences matter for the coordination of daily life; how temporal landscapes matter for issues of 
societal synchronisation; and how timespace/s matter for the organisation of human activity. While 
several studies refer to, draw on, and position themselves in relation to ideas about temporal 
rhythms, those working with theories of practice have yet to fully utilise the potential of Lefebvre’s 
rhythmanalysis for explaining the constitution of, and more specifically, changes within, social life. I 
argue that rhythmanalysis can be effectively combined with practice theory to better articulate the 
ways in which practices become connected through what I describe as processes of 
institutionalisation. I argue that this combination requires repositioning the role of time in theories 
of practice as neither experience, nor as landscape, but, building on Schatzki’s work on the 
timespace of human activity, as practice itself. Drawing on Lefebvre’s concepts of arrhythmia and 
eurhythmia, and developing Parkes and Thrift’s notion of entrainment, I illustrate how institutional 
rhythms, as self-organising, open, spatiotemporal practices emerge, endure, and evolve in ways that 
matter for both socio-temporal landscapes and temporal experiences. 
 





The practice turn in social theory (see Schatzki et al., 2001) has successfully developed new and 
powerful lines of enquiry for examining the constitution of social life. In contrast to various 
structuralist, intellectualist, intersubjectivist, semiotic, and systems theories, a common feature of 
the broad church of theories of practice is that they refuse to promote either the individual or the 
social whole as the fundamental ontological phenomenon of social analysis. Indeed, practice 
theorists interrogate long-standing divisions that underpin such accounts and that exist in social 
theory between the individual and society; agency and structure; the micro and the macro; and 
subject and object, and instead position practices as a fundamental ontology for social enquiry. In 
drawing together, or in fact, rebuking such conceptual distinctions, a practice ontology permits an 
analysis of how certain practices and broader configurations of practices emerge, become 
established in, and disappear from social life. The success of this approach might be measured by 
the array of theoretical and empirical work that takes its cue from theories of practice, and the range 
of substantive issues and topics to which it has been applied. Most notably the impact of changing 
configurations of practices on rates, types, and patterns of consumption (Warde, 2005) has been 
well explored in relation to environmental sustainability (see Shove and Spurling, 2013) and more 
recently in relation to public health (e.g. Cohn, 2014). 
 
Time is central to practice-theoretical accounts of the social, not only because many practice studies 
historically trace the development and persistence of practices, and configurations thereof, over 
time, but also because in reproducing social life, practices are repeated in sequences and 
combinations that exhibit various forms of temporal connection. In some accounts, temporal 
connections between practices, sequences of activity, and therefore temporal patterns depend on 
practitioners’ experiences of time. In others, temporal experience is of less importance and practices 
are instead viewed as being held together in reproducing by a socio-temporal order. Further 
accounts examine how timespace/s1 are a central constitutive and connecting feature of practices. 
However, none of these positions has yet fully articulated how practices become connected in more 
densely entrenched and complexly connected configurations. That is, they have yet to explain how, 
in their repetition, practices have affect across the plenum of practices in ways that matter for the 
ongoing establishment, maintenance, and decline of institutions. In this paper, I ask how Lefebvre’s 
rhythmanalysis ([1992] 2004) might be combined with theories of practice to explain processes of 
institutionalisation (understood as the emergence and entrenchment of various kinds of connections 
between practices) which lead to the establishment of the times and places in which activities of a 
                         
1 Spatial extension is part and parcel of temporal extension and cannot be analytically separated. For the purposes of this 
paper, I focus throughout on the relationship between practice and time, in order to show how time and space are not only 
analytically inseparable from each other, but also from various other effect features of connections between practices. 
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certain kind regularly go on. I claim that rhythmanalysis offers much more than a set of tools to 
describe background socio-temporal orders. It is rather particularly suited to the task of analysing 
the forging and strengthening of connections between practices precisely because it is a theory that 
seeks from the outset to capture the interconnectivity, multiplicity, and complexity of social 
phenomena. 
 
While multiple theories of practice exist and might be demarcated (see Schatzki, 2016b), in this 
paper, I focus in particular on the practice theory of Theodore Schatzki (1996; 2002; 2010) to identify 
opportunities for combining his ideas with rhythmanalysis . I work with this particular version of 
practice theory, as I understand it, not to criticise it, but to help throw light on what I claim to be the 
underutilised concept of rhythms in practice theoretical analyses. I argue that the concept of 
rhythms should be further developed in practice theory to better account for the emergence of 
particular organisations of practices and especially institutional configurations. I refer to Schatzki’s 
practice theory for three reasons. First, it provides a careful and comprehensive account of a 
practice ontology and one that has focussed particularly on the temporal(spatial) aspects of social 
phenomena. Second, it informs a great deal of work on practices, particularly in areas of research 
and debates within the field of sustainable consumption, to which this paper is partly addressed. 
Third, it provides solid conceptual ground from which to understand large social phenomena, like 
institutions, as constituted by configurations of practices and with which to develop an argument 
about how connections within practice organisations emerge. For these reasons I refer to Schatzki’s 
work, and at times those in conversation with it, to more robustly identify and evaluate how 
theories of practice and of rhythms might be combined. 
 
I note from the outset the dangers that arise in attempting to “combine” disparate social ontologies. 
An ontology is a way of conceiving of the world. Conceiving of the social world as made up of 
rhythms is not the same as understanding it as made up of practices. Therefore, any combination 
inevitably requires both building on and modifying each in producing a new conception of the social. 
As Schatzki (2016b) argues in a recent rejoinder to certain combinations and modifications to 
practice theory, this should only be attempted if the two theories are sufficiently compatible. I argue 
that rhythmanalysis is a promising companion for practice theory on three accounts. First, like 
practice theory, the ambition of rhythmanalysis is to move beyond distinctions in social theory and 
the dialectical thinking responsible for them. Second, and as a result of the first, like practice theory, 
rhythmanalysis is a flat ontology. Nothing exists outside of practices or rhythms in each case. Third, 
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like Schatzki’s notion of timespace, time in Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, is a central constitutive 
feature of social phenomena.2 
 
From here I recount a necessarily abridged version of Schatzki’s practice theory, enough to be able 
to demonstrate how it might be successfully and usefully combined with rhythmanalysis. I note that, 
while for Schatzki, practices are not routines, they are inherently open, spatiotemporal entities that 
exhibit forms of regularity. I argue that this definition can also be applied to Lefebvre’s analysis of 
rhythms. I then outline the argument, in response to criticisms that practice theory is not useful for 
or is unable to examine large social phenomena, that practice theory is a flat ontology and therefore 
analyses the constitution of social phenomena such as institutions, as the reproduction of more 
densely entrenched and complexly connected configurations of practices. However, I concede that 
practice theory has so far had less to say about how connections between practices become 
entrenched and go on to suggest that this is in part due to the way that time is most often 
conceptualised in social theory as temporal experience or landscape, as sometimes subjective and 
sometimes objective time. In building on a third way of conceptualising time, as described by 
Schatzki in The Timespace of Human Activity (2010), I call for a combination of practice theory and 
rhythmanalysis that both recognises time as a central constitutive feature of social phenomena and 
that can describe the emergence and entrenchment of connections between practices. I describe 
how Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis can be effectively combined with practice theory to achieve this by 
developing two examples of processes involved in this kind of institutionalisation: eurhythmia and 
arrhythmia and entrainment. I conclude by discussing the conceptual ramifications and empirical 
implications of combining rhythmanalysis and practice theory. 
 
Practices 
According to Schatzki’s account, a practice is first a “… temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed 
nexus of doings and sayings…” (1996: 89) The arrangement of this nexus is first described in Social 
Practices (1996) as organised by practical understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structures (which 
include ends, projects, tasks, purposes, beliefs, emotions, and moods). In his subsequent work, Site 
of the Social (2002), Schatzki amends this list of organising features to include the missing masses of 
non-humans, described as material arrangements, and later fully articulates the temporal and spatial 
organising features of practices in The Timespace of Human Activity (2010). In the first instance, 
practices are therefore discrete spatiotemporal entities (they are made up of connected actions, 
                         
2 It should be noted that in The Timespace of Human Activity (2010), Schatzki disputes the third of these reasons, claiming 
that in rhythmanalysis Lefebvre thought of time as succession and hence, objectively. I make my case for understanding 
time in rhythmanalysis as fundamental feature of rhythms, and therefore the case for the compatibility and effectiveness 
of this combination of theories, in the section titled Time as practice. 
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doings and sayings) which are linked by understandings; rules; teleoaffective structures; material 
arrangements; and interwoven timespaces. An example of a practice is cooking. The actions that 
comprise cooking (turning on the stove, stirring the contents, plating up the food, and so on) are 
linked by understandings of what it is to do cooking (that it is a variously necessary, healthy, and 
communal thing to do); by formal and informal rules about how one goes about cooking (cooking 
foods for prescribed amounts of time, and perhaps clearing up as you go); and teleoaffectivities that 
structure the ends, emotions, and moods involved in cooking a meal (say that might be involved in 
cooking a meal for one’s family). The connections that link actions also extend beyond the practice 
to connect cooking with other practices, into bundles, which might include eating, shopping, and 
driving. In order to make a meal, it is usually required for one to go shopping for the necessary 
ingredients, and to transport these items home, sometimes by driving. This spatiotemporal 
extension of practices is what reproduces everyday and “normal” ways of living and consuming. 
 
Schatzki compliments this first notion of practice as a nexus, with a second of practice as 
performance. This notion of practice denotes the actual do-ing, or enactment of the practice. 
Schatzki writes that: “Each of the linked doings and sayings constituting a practice is only in being 
performed. Practice in the sense of do-ing, as a result, actualizes and sustains practices in the sense 
of nexuses of doings.” (1996: 90) Practices then, have to be performed to be sustained. Without 
enactment by people, practices as nexuses of connections will fail to be reproduced resulting not 
only in the demise of that practice but the demise of necessary connections that call a whole host of 
other practices into being. If people stopped cooking at home, for example, the weekly routine of 
doing “the big shop” at the supermarket might become a thing of the past.  
 
Although it is important to distinguish between these two senses of practice, as nexus and do-ing, 
for conceptualising (among other issues) social change, spatiotemporal extension, and the  
reproduction of large social phenomena, Schatzki emphasises that these two senses of practice are 
inextricably linked as “… two aspects of the one and same reality of human praxis.” (1996: 48) 
Practice theory, therefore, develops an account of social life that starts with practical activity, and 
collapses distinctions between the individual and society, by investigating the spatiotemporal of 
practices, to explain the reproduction of social life. In Schatzki’s words:  
 
“… actions [the, sometimes causally, linked doings and sayings enacted in performance of a practice] 
collect through causality into various sorts of spatiotemporal networks that, in running through and 
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connecting different practices, must be captured by terms other than “practice” - for example, 
“institution,” “group,” and “system”. (1996: 89)  
 
The way that actions collect into spatiotemporal networks that run through and connect different 
practices as “institutions” is the subject of this paper. That is, to articulate the ways that institutions 
and other significant social phenomena might be conceptualised and studied as the reproduction of 
collections of regular, everyday, and “normal” activities. Before saying more about the way that 
practices connect to form institutions, it is necessary to pause for a moment on the issue of 
repetition, regularity, and routine, given its varying significance for different theories of practice and 
the essential role that it plays in rhythmanalysis. 
 
Repetition 
Another oft-quoted definition of what a practice is, comes from Reckwitz paper Towards a Theory of 
Social Practices (2002). He writes that: “A practice (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour…” (249) 
which consist of various bodily and mental activities, things, and knowledges and further that: “A 
practice is thus a routinized way in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are 
treated, things are described, and the world is understood.” (250) Reckwitz’ nod to routine is a 
method of accounting for the reproduction of social order. In his words: “… the idea of routines 
implies the idea of a temporality of structure: Routinized social practices occur in the sequence of 
time, in repetition: social order is thus basically social reproduction.” (2002: 255)  It is therefore 
sometimes thought that practices as entities are closed blocks, patterns, or “ideal types” that are 
then filled out by performances that maintain or change the social order. In a recent contribution 
Schatzki (2016c)  comments precisely on the role of routine in practice theory. He challenges the 
way in which this quote is sometimes adopted, noting that for Reckwitz, a practice is not an “ideal 
type”.3 While practices exhibit regularities they are fundamentally open. As they are enacted in 
context-specific situations, they are forced through reinterpretation and therefore an innovation 
that represents more than pure reproduction. (2016b: 25) Practices, therefore, on Schatzki’s account 
are not routines. In his words: 
 
“… practices are not composed of routines or, more generally, regularities alone. The practice of 
cooking certainly displays regularities: certain foodstuffs are regularly used, certain sequences of 
steps recur, specific pieces of equipment are reused for the same purposes, and so on. [But]… not all 
activities that make up cooking practices are regular or routine: people can use cooking equipment 
                         
3 See also, Shove (2015). 
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in innovative ways, foodstuffs can be mixed in indefinite combinations and in novel ways, people 
depart from recipes, even sequences of steps can be varied.” (Schatzki, 2016b: 24) 
 
Viewing repetition as routine has the potential to introduce a closedness to practice and to following 
understandings of social life. It also imposes limits on variations in performance, and shadows 
conceptions of how “normal” ways of carrying on practices become established. That is to say that 
the closedness of the notion of routine has implications for conceptualising how practices connect 
and how practices and practice orders change. In Schatzki’s account, nexuses of linked doings and 
sayings are only provisionally stable; moments of performance always introduce an extra-ness and 
are what define practices as more than just pure repetition. Practice, for Schatzki therefore, must 
not be defined as pure repetition. However, in its ambition to maintain an open account of the 
reproduction of social life by emphasising the open regularity exhibited by practices, Schatzki’s 
practice theory has much in common with the way that Lefebvre positions repetition in 
rhythmanalysis. In introducing the notion of rhythms he writes: 
 
“But there is no identical repetition, indefinitely. Whence the relation between repetition and 
difference. When it concerns the everyday, rites, ceremonies, fêtes, rules, and laws, there is always 
something new and unforeseen that introduces itself into the repetitive: difference.” (Lefebvre, 
[1992] 2004: 6) 
 
The repetition that characterises Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis is inherently open in the same way that 
Schatzki argues that practices are fundamentally open. For Lefebvre, even when A=A the second A is 
always different, precisely because it is second ([1992] 2004: 7). Moreover, as Henriques, Tiainen, 
and Väliaho (2014) remind us in the introduction to a special issue on rhythm, movement and 
embodiment, for Lefebvre, “… dawn is always new…” (1996} 2003: 231) Of course, significant 
differences emerge between these two accounts, of Lefebvre’s embracing of pure repetition and 
becoming, and Schatzki’s notion of an open temporally and spatially unfolding nexus of doings and 
sayings. However, it is necessary for what follows to point out that practices are not static “ideal 
types” that are filled out by performances. Nor are they routines in the sense that they are closed 
and fixed entities. Rather, in a way that makes them compatible with ideas of rhythm (as we shall 
see) they exhibit fundamental features of repetition. They can only be characterised as routine when 
the idea of routine is understood to be fundamentally and necessarily open. The reason for 
elaborating on the openness of regularity in practices (and rhythms) is that I go on to develop an 
account of practices as open repetitions or, in combining with Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, an account 
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of practices as inherently rhythmic. I argue that emphasising the rhythmicity of practices is essential 
for understanding how practices become connected in more and less entrenched, dense, and 
complex ways in reproducing of large social phenomena and institutions. 
 
Institutions 
Various practice theorists (e.g. Schatzki, 2005; Schatzki, 2006b; Nicolini, 2011; Gherardi, 2000) have 
developed understandings of organisations, institutions, and large social phenomena which are 
rooted in practices. Despite this work, some authors drawing on practice theory ideas contend that 
practices are more or only useful for attending to the minutiae of daily life, or to micro social 
phenomena. Such accounts develop a layered approach, relegating practice theory to accounts of 
interactions that take place in “daily life”, while processes of institutionalisation,  issues of power, 
connection and order are understood by relevance to elevated phenomena sometimes described as 
supra-practice configurations. One such example is the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002). 
 
“The MLP and social practice theory investigate reconfigurations from different angles, with the 
former often following the biography of socio-technical innovations moving from production into 
application domains, and the latter focusing on the dynamics of daily life practices, including the 
appropriation of new technologies.” (Geels et al., 2015: 6) 
 
The implication of such a position is that important work on how practices connect, for example on 
the temporal organisation of everyday life (Southerton, 2005; Southerton, 2006; Southerton, 2013) 
or the timespace of human activity and hence the organisation of social life (Schatzki, 2009; Schatzki, 
2010) fails to capture anything of significance of such large social phenomena. In fact, the separating 
out of practices and socio-technical systems is ontologically inconsistent with the ambitions of 
practice theory, which is precisely to overcome this kind of hierarchical analysis of social 
phenomena.4 Schatzki argues that the spatiotemporal network/s that connect practices, can be 
extended across space and time to account for the whole gamut of human activities that make up 
critical, as well as mundane, social phenomena. In setting out this flat ontology, Schatzki writes that 
in practice theory: “…organizations, power, science, education, and transportation are understood 
as constellations of, aspects of, or rooted in practices.” (Schatzki, 2016c: 28-29) Even features of an 
economy can be analysed as slices through the extensive spatiotemporal network of connections 
that underpins and runs through constellations of practices.  
 
                         
4 For further discussion, see Schatzki (2016c). 
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In practice theory, no special significance, organising potential, or property is attributed to large 
social phenomena. In the same way that practices of shopping, cooking, and driving are collected 
into bundles (variously linked through practical understandings; rules, teleoaffectivities; interwoven 
timespaces; and material arrangements) so too do these bundles connect with other bundles of 
practices, involved in, say, commuting, working, and leisure, to form complexes and constellations. 
In Schatzki’s words: “Constellations of bundles are just larger bundles. So large social phenomena 
(like macro and global ones) have the same composition as do small, local, and micro phenomena: 
they consist of practice-arrangement bundles…”5 (Schatzki, 2011: 2) Schatzki draws on another flat 
ontology, actor-network-theory and Latour’s description of oligoptica and panorama (Latour, 2005: 
178-184) to describe how “large” social phenomena are produced through combinations of “smaller 
phenomena” (Schatzki, 2016c: 38). Translated into practice theory, oligoptica might be thought of as 
a practice or a set of practices that are very densely connected  to a narrow range of other practices. 
A panorama might be thought of as practice that is more loosely connected but to a very large 
number of other practices. While there are important differences in the way that practice theory 
and actor-network-theory conceptualise the social as made up of associations between actors and as 
connections between practices, there are also important similarities in how they deal with issues of 
scale. Importantly, both size and scale and therefore, power are produced and not given. For 
example, shopping might be directly connected to driving and eating, but eating might be connected 
more loosely to a much wider range of activities including work, sleep, family time, meetings, 
celebrations, and so on. The point, is that oligoptica and panorama have affect, but their effect is 
only produced in the maintenance of those connections, that themselves enable practices to be 
reproduced. 
 
To understand large social phenomena in a way that is consistent with practice theory then, is to 
recognise institutions as made up of, regular, everyday practices. As Goffman writes in the 
introduction to Asylums: “Social establishments - institutions in the everyday sense of that term - are 
places such as rooms, suites of rooms, buildings, or plants in which activity of a particular kind 
regularly goes on…” (1991: 15) Alternatively, as Davide Nicolini writes in a recent contribution titled 
Making Sense of ‘Large Phenomena’ from a Practice-Based Perspective that: “… when it comes to 
the social, it is practices all the way down.” (2016: 100) While place or physical location do not limit 
them, institutions as I define them in this paper, are strongly connected organisations of practices, 
combinations and configurations that are regularly reproduced, and that, including forms like 
oligoptica and panorama, have particular and varied effects across the plenum of the social. 
                         




Examples of “institutions” therefore range in “scale” from the regular enactment of activities that 
reproduce hospital, universities, and entire education systems; financial institutions and economies; 
and Christmas dinner, the Monday morning commute, and the timing of domestic labour practices. 
 
Nicolini’s work on Practice Theory, Work and, Organization (2013) explains this approach to 
investigating social life through a method of zooming in and zooming out to reveal processes and 
scales of entrenchment: 
 
“The zooming out of the texture of practice requires patiently following the trails of connections 
between practices; observing how these connections come to form entrenched nexuses or nets; 
how such nets of action produce effects; how such overarching or global practice nets manifest 
themselves in the local practising and how “local” performances are in part constituted through 
distant flows and motilities.” (230) 
 
Just as a flat ontology is an ontological challenge, zooming in and out is a methodological challenge 
to those that would seek to attribute to institutions, organisations, and economies, special 
properties of size, scale, and power. That institutions can be explained through a practice-theoretical 
approach,  by spatiotemporal extension and through understanding the density and complexity of 
different kinds of connections between practices is clear. However, what is less clear is how 
connections become more complexly interconnected and entrenched. It is less clear how particular 
forms of connection like oligoptica and panorama are established, maintained, and how they 
decline. In this paper, I refer to one, important, kind of connection between practices, that is, 
temporal connection. Although temporal connections are always entwined with and part and parcel 
of connections made through practical understandings, rules, teleoaffectivities, spaces, materials, 
and a whole range of other kinds of connections,6 I distinguish temporal connections in this paper to 
demonstrate the underused conceptual power of rhythmanalysis, not only for thinking about 
temporal connections between practices, but more significantly for how, in their repetition, 
practices shape, mould, and affect each other across a whole range of types of connection. 
 
Time and theories of practice 
Readers of this journal well know that time has been thought about in different ways throughout 
history. Aristotle, for example, considered time to be the time of the natural world and as such was 
readable through and made understandable by the changes in planetary motions, the changing of 
                         
6 For a discussion of the layering of different types of connections between practices, see Blue and Spurling (2016). 
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the seasons and so on (see Charlton, 1970). Following Descartes ([1637] 2005) and Kant ([1781] 
1998), modern scholars tended to consider time as depending on the cognitive structures existing in 
the mind of the rational observer. Both contemporary lay and academic thought now tend to 
examine time as made up of a combination of these positions, often divided into two senses as 
scientific and experienced time. This distinction was first conceptualised by Bergson in Time and Free 
Will ([1889] 2008) and this understanding continues to play out in social theories of time. Adam 
(1990; 1995), for example, has demonstrated the importance of understanding these two senses of 
time (and multiple derivatives and interpretations of them) for social theory. While Nowotny’s 
(1992) classic article in this journal explores the range of socio-theoretical resources that are 
underpinned in different ways by one, or both of these ways of thinking about time. The 
conceptualisation of time as split into two (on the on hand counted, quantitative and objective, and 
on the second, experienced, qualitative, and subjective) also plays out in practice theoretical 
accounts and especially in those accounts that seek to explain how practices are temporally 
connected. Below I describe how different positions emphasise each of these senses of time to 
explain the significance of temporal experience for the organisation of daily life and temporal 
rhythms as a background socio-temporal order, respectively. In building on the accounts that follow, 
my intent is not to criticise them, but to show how subjective and objective senses of time are 
mobilised in these respective accounts to achieve their conceptual ambitions. In doing so, I 
demonstrate the opportunities that are afforded for conceptualising processes of institutionalisation 
by adopting a third conceptualisation of time, which builds on Schatzki’s notion of timespace. 
 
Time in practices 
On the one hand, work on practice theory and time emphasises the significance of temporal 
experiences for shaping the temporal organisation of the day. That is, how subjective experiences of 
time are central to the ordering of practices. Work on experiences of time shortage (Southerton et 
al., 2001) and “time-squeeze” (Southerton and Tomlinson, 2005) describes how subjective 
experiences of being harried matter for the temporal organisation of what people do. Empirical 
examples that develop such an approach include how experiences of academic work matter for 
strategies for managing academic life (Spurling, 2015) and how leisure practices, such as wooden 
boating (Jalas, 2006; Jalas, 2009) sustain, and are sustained, by the construction of a variety of 
temporal orientations and meanings. Dale Southerton’s work provides an important point of 
reference. According to Southerton (2006), practices have objective temporal features, (taken from 
Fine’s five dimensions of time 1996) which include periodicity; tempo; synchronisation and 
coordination; duration; and sequence. These features matter for the ways that practitioners allocate 
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practices, or are able to allocate them, within the temporal organisation of the day. Those that have 
shorter durations and that do not depend on particular forms of synchronisation and coordination 
with others (for example, checking emails) are able to be slotted in around practices which have 
temporal features that establish them as more fixed within schedules (for example, duration in the 
case of sleeping, or synchronisation and coordination with other practices in the case of meal times). 
However, practices and combinations of practices are accompanied by certain experiences of time. 
In work on the temporal distribution of domestic labour practices, Southerton shows that people 
rush to fit domestic labour and chores into “hot spots” to make time for “cold spots”, to relax, chill, 
and potter. In his words: 
 
“Hot and cold spots are about attempts to gain personal control over the temporal rhythms of daily 
life. As the accounts of being harried… indicate, such control is actually at the core of how 
harriedness is generated because temporalities are organized collectively.” (Southerton, 2003: 20)  
 
In this practice-theoretical account of the temporal organisation of social life, temporal rhythms are 
conceived as a set of collectively organised and objective temporalities that both create and respond 
to practitioners’ experiences of time. While temporal rhythms (in this formulation, the collective 
accumulations of the objective temporal features of enacted practices) are in an iterative 
relationship with practitioners’ temporal experiences, time is considered to be a property of 
practices, or, we nmight say, time is in practices. As a result, practices are positioned as objective 
social phenomena, which are navigated (with particular constraints) by more and less active 
practitioners. 
 
Practices in time 
On the other hand, some practice theorists place less emphasis on the subjective experience of time 
and instead, concentrate on how, in coming together, practices make time, or constitute temporal 
rhythms. Pantzar and Shove (2010), for example, provide a speculative discussion of the idea that 
temporal rhythms can be considered as the manifest outcomes of relationships between practices. 
More recent work by Southerton (2013) has highlighted the importance of understanding the extent 
to which temporal rhythms configure and condition practices. Moreover, Walker (2014) has 
described how societal rhythms provide temporal structures that organise practices, and hence 
energy demand. More empirical work has built on this idea that temporal rhythms are created by 
and constrain practices. Using time-use data, Anderson (2016) has studied the flexibility of the 
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timing of domestic practices, such as laundry and Torriti (2017) has looked at the extent to which 
other kinds of domestic practices depend on the time of the day, and hence temporal rhythms. 
 
In The Dynamics of Social Practice, Shove, Pantzar, and Watson (2012) describe how practices 
connect to form bundles and complexes and characterise the kinds of linkage involved. Practices, 
they suggest, connect in various ways, including by sequence, synchronisation, proximity, and co-
existence. Drawing on Zerubavel’s (1979) work on patterns of time in hospital life, these authors 
describe how practices both constitute and are shaped by multiple temporal registers in ways that 
matter for when and how practices are reproduced. For example, the working day in the hospital 
may consist of some recurring practices including consultant, medicine, and ward rounds, clinic 
appointments, and surgeries each with their own times and each variously dependent on others, 
connected in sequence and combination. However, the temporal order of the day is also in part 
shaped by the temporal order of the week. The tempo, periodicity, and forms of synchronisation and 
coordination at weekends are very different from those on weekdays in hospitals, as are Mondays 
from Wednesdays. Seasonal and annual temporalities such as economic cycles, winter pressures, 
and school holidays cut across and matter further for the sequences, rate of recurrence, and 
interdependence of practices. These intersecting temporalities constitute a socio-temporal order, or 
temporal rhythms, that shapes connections between practices. Shove, Pantzar, and Watson explain 
that practices connect in the bundles and complexes that they do as a consequence of competition 
and/or collaboration between practices (2012: 88). Some practices suppose and require the 
reproduction of others, and in being reproduced sustain sequences of activity and temporal 
landscapes. Others vie for the resources with which to be reproduced in given complexes, 
potentially disturbing the temporal order. 
 
At the same time as their allegiances and conflicts constitute the socio-temporal order, these 
relations are also constrained and shaped by it. Rather than as in the above example where practices 
are in a recursive relationship with temporal experiences, here practices as subjects are shaped by 
external and objective temporal rhythms. However, Shove, Pantzar, and Watson note that the idea 
that practices compete and collaborate for resources is useful only up to a point. In their words: 
 
“… simple representations of this kind overlook the more subtle point that the recurrent enactment 
of practices and of links between them transform the terms in which competition and/or 




Not only does the repetition of practices, and combinations thereof, transform the terms of 
competition and collaboration, it changes the whole range of ways in which practices connect 
shifting entire complexes of practices. How this kind of emergence and becomingness of 
constellations is to be handled is not entirely resolved. I argue that contending with this requires 
another way of thinking about time in practice. Shove summarises the two standing positions 
concisely. In her words: 
 
“The first… that time is a scarce resource which practices consume. The second is that… temporal 
arrangements arise from the effective reproduction of everyday life, or, to put it more strongly, 
practices make time.” (Shove, 2009: 17) 
 
Taking inspiration from Sallis’ (1997) work on subjectivity, I argue for emphasising and developing a 
third way of thinking about time. Writing on the phenomenology of perception, Sallis suggests that 
there are three ways of conceptualising the relationship between subjectivity and time: “… the first 
alternative says that the subject is in time, the second that time is in the subject, the third that the 
subject is time.” (Sallis, 1997: 347) Similarly, I suggest that the first approach, described above, 
positions time in practices, while the second argues that practices make time. We might also 
consider that time is a constitutive effect feature of practice, or that practice is time.  
 
Time as practice 
In The Time of Activity (2006a) and The Timespace of Human Activity (2010), Schatzki develops just 
such a radical reconfiguration of the role of time(space)7 in practice theory, distinguishing it from 
both objective time (and space) and subjective time (and space) (25-31). He brings Bergson’s notion 
of unfolding duration together with Heidegger’s notion of the teleological dimensionality of the past, 
present, and future of existence, ascribing them respectively to the ongoing activity-mentality 
experience of performance and the hanging together of social life through interconnected practice-
                         
7 Schatzki (2009, 2010) contends that time should not be analytically separated from space. In outlining his version of a 
unified timespace he argues that various conjunctions of social space-time “… tend to conceptualize time and space as 
objective phenomena…” (2010:32). He argues that in such accounts time is always a version of clock and calendar time 
(succession) and that space is always a version of three-dimensional space. As such, Schatzki argues that conceptions of 
social space-time are always conjunctions of distinct, objective phenomena. I noted earlier that interwoven timespaces are 
not the only effect features that run through and connect practices, but that practices are also connected by material 
arrangements, practical understandings, chains of causation, and so on. While timespace is the focus of Schatzki’s (2009, 
2010) work, he also does not privilege temporalspatial connections over those that might be characterised as being 
underpinned by, for example, material arrangements. Indeed, all kinds of connections between practices have temporal 
(and spatial) characteristics. As such, in this piece, I purposefully do not join time and space together. This does not mean 
that I portray them as objective or subjective phenomena, or that I consider them to be somehow independent. Rather my 
intention is to recast what might be considered time, as rhythms. That is, as both the outcome and stimulus for developing 




arrangement bundles (2016a: 27), to argue that time(space) is a constitutive effect feature of human 
praxis. 
 
We can say that the position that Schatzki develops is neither that temporal landscapes are built up 
through practices, nor that practices are organised by subjective experiences of time (hot or cold 
spots, harried, rushed, or chilled time), whether those relationships might be consdiered mutually 
recursive or otherwise. In his words: 
 
“Timespace neither accrues to nor is built up through activity. It is, instead, a central constitutive 
feature of human activity, where by “constitutive” I mean helping to make up what something is, in 
this case activity, essentially is.” (Schatzki, 2010: ix) 
 
 Time is instead conceived of as an inherent and constitutive feature of practices. Human activity 
should, therefore, be understood as inherently temporal. Time is opened, it comes to be, in the 
occurrence, the happening of activity. That is to say that temporal connections between practices, as 
effect features of practices, are made, maintained, and have affect, in the do-ing of practices. 
 
 Schatzki further refers to the interweaving of time(space)s to capture the expansive web of 
connections that form a constitutive and intrinsic infrastructure that underpins, or runs through, 
complexes of practices. In his words: 
 
“… past practice organizations form a context for the current actions that carry on the practices 
involved and maintain their ogranizations. The same holds of interwoven timespaces. The 
interwoven timespaces that have been characterizing the practices people carry on form a context 
for the current activities through which the timespaces involved persist or do not persist.” (Schatzki, 
2010: 213) 
 
This important contribution shows us how the past matters for the present and future of practice 
organisations in indeterminate ways. Past connections as inherent and constitutive effect features of 
practices inform the present do-ing of practices which matters in indeterminate ways for the future 
establishment, maintenance, and decline of connections. Time is intrinsic and opened with practices, 
not accrued or built through them. But Schatzki leaves us with the puzzle of how this plays out. How 
exactly do connections between practices become more and less entrenched, more and less densely 
and complexly established? Explaining the process of developing connections, opened through and 
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contextualised by practices, can be unpacked and further examined through rhythmanalysis. I go on 
to describe how practice theory might be combined with rhythmanalysis to help us to get a grip on 
these processes of institutionalisation.8 
 
A rhythmic ontology of practice 
Lefebvre’s notion of rhythms (always multiple) is particularly powerful because it is built on this 
same third way of conceptualising time and practice, that practice is time. As such, it permits an 
analysis that takes a step both beyond investigating how experiences of ‘time-squeeze’ matter for 
the organisation of daily life and beyond studying how practices constitute or make a temporal 
landscape that enables and constrains performances. As Lefebvre would have it, rhythmanalysis 
presents an opportunity to better develop accounts beyond the pervasive dialectical thinking that is 
responsible for reproducing problematic distinctions and dualisms in social theory. Such an ambition 
also pierces to the core of practice-theoretical ideas. He writes: 
 
“[Rhythmanalysis] does not isolate an object, or a subject, or a relation. It seeks to grasp a moving 
but determinate complexity (determination not entailing determinism).” (Lefebvre, [1992] 2004: 11-
12) 
 
So how does Lefebvre mobilise the concept of rhythms to capture complexity and indeterminacy in 
moving and what does this kind of analysis mean for how we might think about the constitution of 
temporal experiences and temporal landscapes?  
 
In developing a ‘new science’ of rhythmanalysis Lefebvre makes an onto-epistemological claim that 
the social world is composed of rhythms and that the way to study rhythms is through this ‘new 
science’ of rhythmanalysis. Rhythms compose all kinds of social phenomena and we can therefore, 
                         
8 It should be noted that Schatzki discusses Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis at some length in The Timespace of Human Activity 
(2010) , arguing that it is not compatible with his notion of timespace on two counts: first that Lefebvre’s is a combination 
of independent phenomena of time and space, and second that time as it is considered in rhythmanalysis is the time of 
succession. In response, I make two comments. First, that even though Lefebvre does not focus on space in rhythmanalysis, 
that, as Schatzki notes (2010: 36) he did write extensively about space, most notably in The Production of Space (1991). 
Regardless of whether this work can be read into rhythmanalysis, the explanatory title Space, Time and Everyday Life as 
well as the key assertion that rhythms are always composed of time, space, and an expenditure of energy ([1992] 2004: 
15), suggests that  for Lefebvre time and space are not independent but, as they are in Schatzki’s notion of timespace 
integrated, and constitutive of (social) phenomena. Second, and following this, that Lefebvre’s analysis is precisely a 
critique of the sense of objective time understood as succession. This reading is disputed by, among others, Elden (2004: 
173). These points could be debated further, however my aim here is not to show the relevant differences and similarities 
between Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis and Schatzki’s practice theory. Instead in combining them my ambition is to build on 
and modify each to develop a new theory that can capture how connections between practices become entrenched and 
established through processes of institutionalisation. Therefore, I follow Schatzki in conceiving of time (and space) as 
integrated and intrinsically connected phenomena and that, therefore, time is not a version of succession, but instead 




consider practices as open spatiotemporal entities, to be rhythmic. Importantly rhythms must not be 
regarded as things. Part of the innovation of rhythmanalysis is to resist the reification and 
presentation of identification. Like practices then, rhythms are not closed entities. Neither are they 
subjects or objects of an action or a relation. They are movings, forces, expenditures of energy that 
return with varying regularity in time and space. They are characterised by repetition and difference, 
by birth, growth, peak, and decline, and by their affect across a polyrhythmic ensemble. 
 
A theory of practice inspired by rhythmanalysis would seek to make similar claims about the world 
and how it might be studied. Building from the claim that the social world is populated by practices, 
it would extend this position to argue that practices, as open spatiotemporal entities are repeated in 
time and space (repetition not involving closure), and that in being repeated, in returning, practices 
are changed, shaped also by the repetition, the moving, of others. This would not equate to an 
analysis of how one practice shapes another (recursively or otherwise), but how the moving of 
rhythms, the repetition of practices, ripples through the complexity of movings and doings that 
constitute the plenum of practices and the polyrhythmic ensemble. 
 
At this point it is important to note that, as with ideas about practices, concepts of rhythms have 
been drawn on and developed by a variety of authors, from a range of disciplines, to study a number 
of empirical cases. In an edited collection on Geographies of Rhythm, Edensor and colleagues (2010) 
explore issues of rhythm and space across a number of sites from urban outreach in the 
polyrhythmic city (Hall, 2010), to changing everyday life in rural Irish towns (Conlon, 2010), to 
improvising cycling rhythms in urban spaces (Spinney, 2010). A recent special issue edited by Smith 
and Hetherington (2013) continues this theme on Urban Rhythms examining the rhythms of carnival 
crowds (Jaguaribe, 2013), the railway station (Revill, 2013), and the twenty-four-hour city (Smith and 
Hall, 2013).  Henriques, Tiainen, and Väliaho (2014) and colleagues bring a range of historical 
antecedents to Lefebre’s writing on rhythms, including Bode (2014), Laban (2014), and Spencer 
(1867), to bear on contemporary understandings of embodiment, culture, and rhythm in a collection 
that investigates the rhythms of gymnastics and dance (Crespi, 2014), of playing video games 
(Väliaho, 2014), and those involved in the sonic events of digital sound installations (Ikoniadou, 
2014). Moreover, as described above, various theories of practice have adopted ideas from 
rhythmanalysis to explain the constitution of objective temporal rhythms. Walker, for example, has 




“The observable social patterns of repetition that we classify as rhythms are essentially patterns in 
the   routinised or habituated doing of practices in similar ways at similar times (eating, sleeping, 
washing, for example), and/or a functional coordination of different practices into connected 
sequences (waking, then dressing, then eating, then travelling, then working and so on) (Southerton, 
2013).” (Walker, 2014: 3) 
 
Using an understanding of rhythms to explain the time dependency of activities and societal 
synchronisation is an important contribution. Nevertheless, Lefebvre’s concept of rhythms cannot be 
straightforwardly imported into an already established theory of practice. In Lefebvre’s analysis, 
rhythms are not only the observable outcomes of coordinated and aggregated activity reproduced 
over time. In fact, he warns against this kind of analysis and parcelling out, or quantitative addition 
of, the times of activities. Even though it first appears as a robust and scientific method, it can only 
capture descriptions and sequences of time and misses the ways in which practices connect, shape, 
and affect each other in constituting the plenum of activity: 
 
“To pose the question of rhythms clearly, let us return to everyday life and the description of a day. 
The use of time fragments it, parcels it out. A certain realism is constituted by the minute description 
of these parcels; it studies activities related to food, dress, cleaning, transport, etc. It mentions the 
employed products. Such a description will appear scientific; yet it passes by the object itself, which 
is not the sequence of lapses of time passed in this way, but their linking together in time, therefore 
their rhythm. The essential will get lost, to the gain of the accidental, even - especially - if the study 
of fragments enables us to theorise certain structures of the everyday.” (Lefebvre and Régulier, 
[1985] 2004: 77) 
 
If taken to mean the aggregate of all practices (temporal rhythms as societal synchronisation), then 
the concept of rhythms loses much of its theoretical punching power, more straightforwardly 
providing a few more tools to analyse a cumulative periodicity. But the idea of rhythms is neither the 
same as periodicity, nor is it only observable or actualising at an aggregate level. Instead rhythmicity 
can be understood as part of the essential character of practices and the plenum of practices. A 
reconceptualisation of practices through a rhythmic ontology prepares the ground for a deeper 
analysis of the ways in which practices affect each other in being reproduced. Such an approach 
would consider practices as no longer constrained by an external temporal landscape or 




The aim of combining practice theory with rhythmanalysis should be to capture the ways that 
practices are linked, how they become more and less densely connected, temporally and in all other 
kinds of ways. It is to explain how practices become more fixed and flexible within bundles, 
complexes, and constellations, and how connections become more entrenched, established and 
institutionalised. In this way, this combination of practice theory and rhythmanalysis provides a 
powerful and novel description and explanation of how time is implicated in social action. Practices 
are now inherently temporal because they essentially return in time and space (they are rhythmic) 
and in returning they are always different. Moreover, they are inherently multiple because they are 
no longer (provisionally) stable entities but always partly made up of and responding to other 
moving practices. As such, practices no longer constitute a separate temporal landscape, nor are 
they shaped by subjective experiences of time, but in moving, they affect the plenum of activities, 
impacting on when, where, and how action happens in multiple, complex, and indeterminate ways. 
 
In such a formulation, neither time nor practices are now qualified by experience, understood as 
short or long, ‘harried’ or ‘chilled’. Nor are they counted in terms of days, minutes, weeks and 
decades, shifts, terms, or seasons. Time can instead be thought of as an expression of the forces that 
practices exert across the plenum of the social as they are enacted and repeated. Time becomes 
instead something like the rippling effect across the pond that matters objectively for when and 
where action happens and that matters subjectively for experiences of ‘time-squeeze’, ‘time-
pressure’, and ‘chill-time’. These subjective and objective times, experiences and days of the week, 
in this analysis become expressions or outcomes of the repetition of practices. Taking up the concept 
of rhythms in this way affords new opportunities to study how practices affect and are affected 
across the plenum of activity. It also requires a new vocabulary. In the final section I articulate two 
example processes of institutionalisation: eurhythmia and arrhythmia and entrainment which begin 
to describe the entrenching, stabilising, reinforcing, as well as the disruption, breakdown, and 
decline of connections between practices. 
 
Institutional rhythms 
If social life can be conceptualised as made up of multiple and intersecting, moving practices that, in 
being reproduced affect and shape other practices within the plenum of activity, and that in 
returning change and are changed, then we need new ways of describing the processes that 
characterise the ways that bundles, complexes, and constellations of practices are reproduced, 
emerge, break down, and shift. Concepts that describe relations between two or three entities, as in 
competition or harmony will be insufficient for the task, for grasping this moving, and indeterminate 
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complexity. What is required is a novel analysis and vocabulary that does not focus on isolating 
subjects, objects, relations, or chains of causation, and instead captures the exertion and expression 
of forces, the ebb and flow of activities and the ripples of influence that extend through the plenum 
of activity and that establish institutional rhythms. Only a handful of resources exist for 
conceptualising these processes. Lefebvre gives us a first foothold; others might be adopted and 
adapted from the chronogeography of Parkes and Thrift (1979; 1980); and it is possible to imagine 
more. In this section, I outline Lefebvre’s ideas of eurhythmia and arrhythmia and the notion of 
entrainment taken from Parkes and Thrift and developed by Schwanen et al. (2012). 
 
Eurhythmia and Arrhythmia 
Lefebvre’s description of the relationship between eurhythmia and arrhythmia provides a first way 
of conceptualising how in their repetition, practices establish and strengthen connections.  Within a 
given polyrhythmia there exists bundles, or collections of rhythms that are in sync, healthy, and 
“normed”. Lefebvre describes these rhythms as eurhythmia. In that same polyrhythmia there are 
rhythms that are desynchronising, pathological, and different. He describes these as arrhythmia. In 
eurhythmia, rhythms mutually depend on, support, and reinforce each other. The repetition of a 
given bundle of rhythms necessarily calls into being others and is itself reproduced  through that 
repetition. In arrhythmia, rhythms fail to be repeated in a synchronised, healthy, and “normal” way 
and break down. Because rhythms depend on and are variously interconnected with each other, a 
given arrhythmia can bring a whole eurhythmia into fatal disaster (Lefebvre, [1992] 2004: 16) 
 
Most importantly, eurhythmia and arrhythmia must not be associated with arguments about the 
way that practices collaborate and compete for the time, space, or other kinds of resources with(in) 
which to be reproduced. Ideas about collaboration and competition require relations between 
practices to be provisionally fixed and static, existing as in harmony or in conflict. Thinking in terms 
of the eurhythmia and arrhythmia of repetitions of practices is rather about process, dynamism, and 
flux. Eurhythmia is not opposed to arrhythmia in the same way that collaboration is opposed to 
competition. Instead every eurhythmia always already contains arrhythmia, pauses, breaks, and off-
beats. As arrhythmia are reproduced they weaken previously strong connections, but in doing so, 
they also build and strengthen other and new connections, new eurhythmia. It is this dynamic 
relation between rhythms that matters for processes of disrupting and weakening connections, 
while at the same time strengthening and establishing dense and complex connections. In being 
regularly reproduced, eurhythmia, that is, organisations of practices, are strengthened and made 
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more resilient to the affects of arrhythmia. Lefebvre and Régulier describe this dynamic process and 
relation through the metaphor of the rolling, rocking, and moving of the sea. 
 
“But look closely at each wave. It changes ceaselessly. As it approaches the shore, it takes the shock 
of the backwash: it carries numerous wavelets, right down to the tiny quivers that it orinentates, but 
which do not always go in its direction… Powerful waves crash upon one another, creating jets of 
spray; they disrupt one another, absorbing, fading, rather than crashing, into one another.” 
(Lefebvre and Régulier, [1985] 2004: 79) 
 
Bringing the notions of eurhythmia and arrhythmia to bear on practice theory to understand the 
establishment of institutions, like the working day, education systems, or entire economies means 
considering that as practices return day after day, hour after hour, and seemingly more sporadically, 
they bring with them (sometimes distantly) connected practices. Practice organisations can then be 
considered as polyrhythmia, eurhythmic complexes of practices capable of absorbing arrhythmia, 
and at the same time being made up of precisely those disruptions and collaborations as they fade 
and absorb into each other. Even significant disruptions, take for example the globbal financial crash 
of 2008, might be conceived of as arrhythmia that result in widespread and long lasting disruption, 
reconfiguration, and modification, but that do not destroy institutional rhythms, and that are unable 
to put an end to “normal” configurations of the working day, systems of education, or indeed, 
financial instituions.  Once we consider that eurhythmia, established practice organisations are those 
with strong, dense and, complex connections, capable of resisting arrhythmia, the question that 
follows is how is it that certain practice organisations become stronger and more resilient than 
others? How do they become weaker, leading to the decline of regular and established practice? The 
concept of entrainment offers further insight into this process. 
 
Entrainment 
In their (1979) paper on Time Spacemakers and Entrainment, Parkes and Thrift draw inspiration from 
research in the field of chronobiology, particularly from the idea that temporal development in 
biological organisms is a result of numerous interconnected periodicities that are fundamental 
characteristics of biological processes. They argue that social life can also be thought to be 
constituted in the same way, as being made up of so many “clocks”. They write: “The territory of 
human action is established through the occurrence of recurrent events both rhythmic and 
periodic…” (355) As geographers, and in developing the field of chrono-geography, Parkes and Thrift 
are particularly concerned with spacemaking and the territory of human action. That is, how the 
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repetition of human action plays out in the constitution of place. Leaving aside the specifically spatial 
aspects of the organisation of the social for the moment, what is important to take from this work 
for the purposes of this paper is the idea that the repetition of activity is fundamental to the 
establishment of order in social life. Parkes and Thrift suggest that repetitious cycles of activity exert 
force on and shape each other, and that some set the pace for the recurrence of others. 
 
“The environment of our lifeworld contains synchronizing or entraining forces… These entraining 
agents may be referred to as Zeitgebern, time-givers or time-producers. They impel another cycle to 
assume synchronization…” (Parkes and Thrift, 1979: 356) 
 
Adopting this idea of entrainment is particularly useful becasue it allows us to get a handle on the 
dynamics of the plenum of activity. It permits an investigation of which rhythms impel others to 
assume synchronisation, to search for distantly connected and affected rhythms and to point out 
which rhythms are not drawn with the returning of a set of activites. Nevertheless, caution needs to 
be taken in adopting this idea so as not to overplay the role of Zeitgebern. The ability to entrain must 
not be considered as an objective temporal feature or element of a given set of rhythms or 
practices. It does not exist in practices. Such an analysis risks repeating theoretical mis-steps that 
distinguish between lower and higher tiers of activity, between those practices that can entrain and 
those that cannot. Adapting the idea of entrainment to a rhythmic ontology of practice means 
recognising entraining forces as neither abstract, distinct, or universal elements. Entrainment is 
rather an ongoing and contested process. Entraining forces exist only by virtue of the reproduction 
of a given polyrhythmia. Just as relationships between rhythms are continuously becoming different 
as they are repeated in connection with others, so too do resulting entraining forces evolve. So, 
while Parkes and Thrift advocate identifying and hunting for the Zeitgebern, and the “clocks of social 
strucutres”, I rather suggest that the idea of entrainment can be developed not as a property of 
rhythms, but as a product of the affect exerted through the plenum of activcity. 
 
To illustrate this idea, it will be useful to refer to how Schwanen et al. (2012) mobilise this concept in 
their study of the rhythms of urban nightlife. This study emphasises that temporal ecologies, as they 
describe them, are exclusionary and therefore contested. Their research shows that the rhythms of 
the opening and closing of bars and clubs shape women’s participation in the night time economy 
much more than they do men’s. Leaving aside the added complexity of exclusion and inequality for 
the moment, what this study highlights first is the entraining capcities of bar and club opening times. 
They write: “The stronger the entraining capacities of an element, the more its effects will ripple 
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through a polyrhythmic ensemble as an accordion effect and the greater the rhythmic conformity 
that will ensue… (Schwanen et al., 2012: 2066) Rhythmic conformity, the strength of eurhythmia to 
be able to resist arrhythmia, is directly related to entraining capacities. Certain, well established, 
institutional rhythms are able to entrain others, or in their words: “… institutionally inscribed 
rhythms, such as opening hours of facilities and public transport timetables, are capable of 
entraining the rhythms of many practices and people in a given place (Parkes and Thrift, 1980).” 
(Schwanen et al., 2012: 2066-2067) For Schwanen et al., institutional rhythms have far reaching and 
entraining effects. They also observe, following DeLanda (2013), that they are usually characterised 
by a ‘slower’ rate of change. In any case, the central point is that instituional rhythms are not 
manifestations of hierarchical process, or representative of macro socail phenomena that exists 
beyond the plenum of practices. 
 
Institutional rhythms then, are composed of returning and connected, open spatiotemporal 
practices, albeit in a configuration that exhibits a strong eurhythmia. Schwanen et al. are clear when 
they write: “Entrainment should not, however, be seen as a deterministic and top-down or 
hierarchical process emanating from a single core or a few centres… entrainment is open-ended, 
characterised by contestation, and based on local self-organisation.” (2012: 2066) The analytical 
consequence for a rhythmic ontology of practices is therefore not to hunt for the Zeitgebern, but to 
investigate the processes of institutionalisation as the emergence, establishment, and entrenchment 
of connections between returning practices. That is to understand how a given set of rhythms are 
reproduced and in returning strengthen their connections that enable and support further 
repetition. With this approach, entrainment is not an ability or feature of a set of institutionally 
inscribed rhythms but an outcome or expression of the moving of rhythms within a polyrhythmia as 




The aim of this paper has been to develop understandings within the field of theories of practice of 
how practice connect to form bundles, complexes, and constellations, and to show how processes of 
connection matter for conceptualising institutions. I suggested that theories of practice, while 
recognising a range of types of connections, often emphasise the importance of temporal 
connections between practices for explaining the constitution of social life and its temporal 
organisation. I claimed however, that connections between practices are not mediated by subjective 
experiences of time, and nor are they shaped by an external set of temporalities (sometimes 
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described as temporal rhythms) of their own making. I argued that in order to explain the 
establishment, entrenchment, and disruption of connections, that it is necessary to reposition time 
within practice theory not as existing in practices, or to consider that practices are in time, but to see 
time as a central constitutive feature of practices, or that time is practice. Conceptually, the 
implications of combining practice theory with rhythmanalysis is that time is no longer an external 
phenomena against which organisations of practices should be read. Neither is temporal 
organisation drawn out and privileged from other forms of connection, not only spatial, but 
material, jurisdictional, and so on. Empirically this means, following Lefebvre and Régulier, ([1985] 
2004) that studies of everyday life and the patterning of ways of living and consuming should not 
(only) seek to examine the products of institutional rhythms, that is the parcelled out sequences of 
time and their cumulative periodicity in the forms of societal synchronisation and externalised 
temporal rhythms. Instead, studies building from the approach outlined in this paper would 
investigate how rhythmic practices become and have become connected on their own terms. Ideas 
of eurhythmia and arrhythmia and entrainment provide two examples of the local self-organisation 
of institutional rhythms, but there are more to be discerned, to explain further how rhythms absorb 
one another, bifurcate and split apart, how they take forms like oligoptica and panorama, and how 
they come to colonise polyrhythmia. Moreover, in developing further this emerging vocabulary and 
analysis, it will be necessary to account for several issues that I have “put to one side” in this paper. 
These include more fully articulating the layering of constitutive effect features of practices 
(including their intertwined temporal, spatial, material, and jurisdictional aspects), and 
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